Product details
- Categories: Geopolitics, Governance & Politics
- Publisher: PALGRAVE-MACMILLAN
- ISBN: 9783319551364
- Publication Date: 01/11/2017
- Binding: Paperback
- Number of pages: 304
Summary
This book assesses the use and limitations of the principal-agent model in a context of increasingly complex political systems such as the European Union. Whilst a number of conceptual, theoretical and methodological challenges need to be addressed, the authors show that the principal-agent model can still provide deeper insights into a wide range of political phenomena. Through an empirical analysis of multiple principal-agent relations in the EU, covering a variety of policy fields and political actors, the volume refines our theoretical understanding of the politics of delegation and discretion in the EU. It will appeal to scholars in interested in EU politics and policy, public administration and governance, and international organisations.
The chapter ‘Multiple principals preferences, different types of oversight mechanisms, and agent’s discretion in trade negotiations’ is published open access under a CC BY 4.0 license via link.springer.com.
Table of contents
Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union
Delreux, Tom (et al.)
Pages 1-34
The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy
Brandsma, Gijs Jan (et al.)
Pages 35-54
Non-exclusive delegation to the European External Action Service
Dijkstra, Hylke
Pages 55-81
Designing a Collective Agent for Trilogues in the European Parliament
Laloux, Thomas
Pages 83-103
Agent Interaction as a Source of Discretion for the EU High Representative
Helwig, Niklas
Pages 105-129
Impact of the Agent’s Environment on Discretion in the Field of EU Conflict Resolution
Plank, Friedrich (et al.)
Pages 131-155
Manifest and Latent Control on the Council by the European Council
Kroll, Daniela Annette
Pages 157-180
Effects of Contestation Within a Collective Agent in EU Trade Policy-Making
Gastinger, Markus
Pages 181-202
Multiple Principals’ Preferences, Types of Control Mechanisms and Agent’s Discretion in Trade Negotiations
Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia
Pages 203-226
Agents as Information Asymmetry Managers in EU Trade Policy-Making
Coremans, Evelyn (et al.)
Pages 227-253
Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion
Reykers, Yf (et al.)
Pages 255-281
Conclusion. Opportunities and Challenges for the Principal–Agent Model in Studying the European Union
Adriaensen, Johan (et al.)